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RETHINKING RELATIONSHIP-SPECIFIC
INVESTMENTS: SUBCONTRACTING IN THE
JAPANESE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY

J.

Yoshiro Miwa*
Mark Ramseyer**

Longer ago than either of us cares to remember, one of us attended
junior high in Tokyo. On Saturdays, he worked at a printed circuit fac
tory. Or maybe ''factory" makes it all sound too grand. A small building
in back of a gas station, it had three or four punch presses. The "presi
dent" supervised matters (though he actually spent more time hanging out
at the gas station), together with a sidekick who did assorted odd jobs be
sides. Several middle-aged women with no apparent technical education
or skill ran the presses.
The junior high kid spent his time trimming the sheets to which others
would eventually attach the transistors. The women then punched the
holes and margins onto the boards, and the president's sidekick loaded the
finished boards onto a truck. Periodically, he returned them to the firm
that had ordered the work and brought more sheets to punch along with
any press dies the firm needed. The punch presses were standard generic
affairs, and the buyer seems to have kept title to the dies.
Thirty years later, the other one of us knows the president of a factory
near Nagoya. For many years, the firm has done machining work for a
first-tier Toyota subcontractor. Unfortunately for the firm, Toyota has in
creasingly substituted integrated plastic units for the steel shock absorber
parts the firm machines. Worried that the Toyota-bound work might dis
appear, the president has begun to move the firm toward machining mate
rials for computer hard disks on the side.
A machining firm can make a wide variety of products, the president
seemed to explain. His firm could make products for the automobile in
dustry or otherwise, Toyota-bound or otherwise. If the demand for shock
absorber parts fell, well then it would simply make computer disks instead.

* Professor of Economics, University of Tokyo. B.A., Ph.D., University of Tokyo. Ed. We received helpful comments and suggestions from Eric Feldman, Tomotaka Fujita,
Yoshitaka Fukui, William Grimes, John Haley, Shuichi Hashimoto, Hideki Kanda,
Y oshitsugu Kanemoto, William Klein, Motonari Kurasawa, Richard Lempert, Scott Masten,
Toshihiro Matsumura, Curtis Milhaupt, Kazuro Saguchi, Kazuo Wada, Mark West, Noriyuki
Yanagawa, and participants at workshops at Harvard University, the University of Michigan,
and the University of Tokyo. We gratefully acknowledge the generous financial assistance
of the Sloan Foundation (Miwa and Ramseyer) and the John M. Olin Center for Law, Eco
nomics & Business at the Harvard Law School (Ramseyer). We thank the many officials of
various suppliers who permitted and facilitated Miwa's interviews and on-site visits.
**
Mitsubishi Professor of Japanese Legal Studies, Harvard University. B.A. 1976,
Goshen College; A.M. 1978, University of Michigan; J.D. 1982, Harvard University. - Ed.
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What neither of us saw in either firm was any evidence of invest
ments that were specific to the firm's trading partners. Yet whether
such relationship-specific investments ("RSis") structure the ar
rangements firms make matters. Indeed, for at least two independent
reasons, whether they structure the Japanese automobile industry
matters crucially.
Within law and economics, the prevalence of RSis matters because
of the way the issue goes to the heart of market contracting. At root,
RSI theory challenges our routine assumption that straightforward
market contracting produces something close to socially optimal ar
rangements. Although the theory is clear, the empirics are less so.
Scholars have looked hard for evidence of governance arrangements
driven by large relationship-specific investments. To date, they have
reached only mixed conclusions. They find substantial evidence of the
relation between RSis and governance within idiosyncratic industries
like public utilities, aerospace, and defense. Although they find some
evidence of the relation within "ordinary" industries, they find consid
erably less. In that empirical vacuum, the Japanese automobile indus
try has stood as a prominent exception - an important example of
RSI-driven extra-contractual governance arrangements in an "ordi
nary" industry.
Within Japanese studies, RSis provide a convenient theoretical ra
tionale for taking the conventional tales of "socially embedded" con
tracts and relational stability at face value. To date, all too many
scholars have been all too happy to "explain" these tales by citing
strong cultural norms of integrity or obligation. The theoretically
more astute justifiably find the "explanations" hollow. For them, RSis
have offered an analytically coherent incentive-compatible rationale
for exactly the same tales.
In this Article, we argue that the usual accounts of the industry are
myth. Notwithstanding those accounts, the industry does not contain
widespread, substantial physical-asset or human-capital RSis. To the
extent that we are right, theorists might do well to rethink the empiri
cal role RSI theory has played over the past two decades. We do not
argue that firms never make RSis or that contracts will always solve
incentive problems. Far be it from us to make such a claim, especially
since this Article is only about one industry in one country. Neither
do we claim that RSI theory is wrong as theory. Neither of us is a
theorist, this is not a theoretical paper, and the intuition behind RSI
theory has generally made sense to us anyway. Instead, we make a
more modest point: that modem production may require lower levels
of idiosyncratic investment than we have usually supposed; that mar
ket contracting may work better than usually asserted; and that, as a
result, RSI theory may explain less of the contracting and governance
patterns in place than scholars have often asserted.
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In this Article, we argue that RSis in the Japanese automobile in
dustry are usually quite small and usually play a minor role. Toward
that end, we begin by summarizing the implications RSI theory poses
for contract theory (Section I.A) and surveying the empirical evidence
(Section I.B-.C). We then turn to the Japanese automobile industry.
First, we anecdotally canvass the practices at Honda (Section II.B),
and provide a background to the industry as a whole (Section II.C).
Second, we examine the evidence of RSis among second- and third
tier suppliers (Section III.A).
Finally, we examine the evidence
among first-tier suppliers (Section III.B).

I.

SPECIFIC-lNVESTMENTTHEORY
A.

Theldea:

Relationship-specific investments matter - and matter deeply argue Oliver Williamson, Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford, and
Armen Alchian.1 Dozens of scholars have since repeated the logic
they pioneered, and today it graces such mainstream sources as the in
dustrial organization text of Dennis Carlton and Jeffrey Perloff and
the management text of Paul Milgrom and John Roberts.2 According
to this intuition, the scope and size of RSis can directly affect the gov
ernance arrangements firms choose. Whether business partners nego
tiate long-term contracts, spot contracts, equity investments, franchise
arrangements, or even mergers can depend vitally on the RSis at
stake.
Crucially, investments specific to a relationship generate appropri
able quasi rents. In a world of incomplete contracting, as Scott
Masten, James Meehan, Jr., and Edward Snyder put it, that appropri
ability may increase the "resources expended attempting to negotiate
a favorable distribution of the gains from trade. "3 In the words of
Klein, Crawford, and Alchian themselves, "[a]fter a specific invest
ment is made and such quasi rents are created, the possibility of op
portunistic behavior is very real."4 To avoid such rent-seeking and

1. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM:
FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, THE
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM); Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Ap·
propriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 2'Yl (l'Y78);
Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Rela
tions, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (l'Y79) [hereinafter Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics].
2. DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION chs. 2, 13 (2d ed. 1994); PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS,
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT ch. 9 (1992). The theory plays an even more pro·
nounced role in DAVID BESANKO ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF STRATEGY pt. I (1996).
3. Scott E. Masten et al., The Costs of Organization, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 6 (1991).
4. Klein et al., supra note 1, at 298.
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rent-avoidance costs, firms may sometimes introduce governance ar
rangements that are otherwise unnecessary (and probably problem
atic, given the way most of them weaken market incentives). RSis can
potentially transform a competitive market exchange into a bilateral
monopoly, in other words. When appropriate contractual arrange
ments are infeasible, that transformation may call forth arrangements
that otherwise would be superfluous at best.5 Or as Klein, Crawford,
and Alchian write:

The crucial assumption underlying the analysis of this Article is that,
as assets become more specific and more appropriable quasi rents are
created (and therefore the possible gains from opportunistic behavior in
creases [sic]), the costs of contracting will generally increase more than
the costs of vertical integration. Hence, ceteris paribus, we are more
likely to observe vertical integration.6

The Evidence

B.
1.

GM-Fisher Body7

Consider a short summary of the anecdote Klein, Crawford, and
Alchian used to popularize this analysis: the 1926 merger between
General Motors and Fisher Body.
Before 1919, claim Klein,
Crawford, and Alchian, car companies used wooden or wood-and
metal coaches. Making these early coaches involved standard tools
and standard knowledge. Making a good one took skill, but it was a
skill a coachmaker could use as easily to fit a coach onto a frame by
assembler A as onto one by assembler B. Conversely, assembler A
could as easily use a coach from coachmaker X as from coachmaker Y.
In this pre-1919 world, continue Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, as
semblers and coachmakers traded on what was virtually a spot market.
In doing so, they took little risk. If a coachmaker stopped selling, the
assembler could buy its coaches elsewhere. If an assembler stopped
buying, the coachmaker could sell its coaches elsewhere. As neither
had invested much in either assets or skills that were specific to the
relationship, neither had much to lose from switching contract part
ners.
By the next decade, Klein, Crawford, and Alchian write, car mak
ers started to make standardized coaches out of steel. Fashioning
these steel coaches required dies. In turn, these dies cost large sums,

5. See Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics, supra note 1, at 241-42.
6. Klein et al., supra note 1, at 2Q8.
7. After this Article was written but before it went to press, we received a copy of
Ramon Casadesus-Masanell & Daniel F. Spulber, The Fable of Fisher Body, 43 J.L. &
ECON. 67 (2000). We urge readers interested in the Fisher Body example to consult the ex
tremely careful account in Casadesus-Masanell & Spulber. Many of our own conclusions
about the relevance of RSI theory track their conclusions.
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and could be used only for specific models. Now, the assembler and
coachmaker faced the prospect of investing in an asset that paid off
only within the relationship. As such, the asset generated appropri
able quasi rents: if the coachmaker bought the die, the assembler
could threaten to end the relationship in order to shift the terms of the
deal in its favor.8
Rather than risk this opportunism, reason Klein, Crawford, and
Alchian, assemblers and coachmakers integrated vertically. In 1919,
Fisher Body and General Motors entered into a long-term contract.
Alas, given the problems inherent in long-term contracts in the real
world, opportunism-related problems persisted. By 1926, GM simply
acquired Fisher Body outright. Given the large RSis involved, the two
firms found it paid to eliminate the risk through vertical integration.
2.

RSI Taxonomy

To Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, the risk of opportunism in the
GM-Fisher Body relationship lay in the investment in large stamp
dies: "The manufacture of dies for stamping parts in accordance with
the above specifications gives a value to these dies specialized to [the
assembler], which implies an appropriable quasi rent in those dies.
Therefore, the die owner would not want to be separate from [the as
sembler]."9 Yet such physical assets are not the only RSis that theo
rists identify. Oliver Williamson, for example, cites several types of
RSis, of which we consider three here:

site specificity
e.g. successive stations that are located in a cheek-by
jowl relation to each other so as to economize on inventory or transpor
tation expenses;
physical asset specificity e.g. specialized dies that are required to pro
duce a component; [and]
human asset specificity that arises in a learning-by-doing fashion . 10
-

-

.

.

.

The evidence of occasional site specificity may well be the strong
est. If a utility company builds a generating plant near a coal mine, for
example, the utility and mine lock themselves into a relation close to a
bilateral monopoly. Sometimes, this affects the governance structures
they choose.11

8. In fact, Casadesus-Masanell & Spurber, supra note 7, at 84-86, point out that Fisher
Body did not begin to produce exclusively metal bodies until the late 1930s.
9. Klein et al., supra note 1, at 308.
10. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra note 1, at 95
(emphasis added). Williamson also discusses a fourth category of "dedicated assets." See
id.; see also Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics, supra note 1.
11. See Keith J. Crocker & Scott E. Masten, Mitigating Contractual Hazards: Unilateral
Options and Contract Length, 19 RAND J. ECON. 327 (1988); Stephen J. DeCanio & H.E
Frech III, Vertical Contracts: A Natural Experiment in Gas Pipeline Regulation, 149 J.
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 149, 370 (1993); C. Paul Hallwood, On Choosing
.
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The evidence of human-capital specificity is more tenuous, though
here too some scholars claim to find evidence on point. Marketing
scholars, for example, argue that employees sometimes invest in
brand-specific knowledge in ways that affect the governance choices
firms make.12 Others claim that employees invest in relation-specific
manufacturing know-how to similar effect.13
By contrast, observers tend to find less evidence (though more
than zero, to be sure) of the sort of physical-asset specificity Klein
Crawford-Alchian use to explain the GM-Fisher Body merger.
Granted, Keith Crocker and Kenneth Reynolds conclude that physi
cal-asset specificity affects the structure of defense procurement deci
sions.14 Scott Masten makes the same point about government aero
space purchases.15 Yet if ever there were idiosyncratic procedures, the
defense and aerospace industries would be the. place to find them. In

Organizational Arrangements: The Example of Offshore Oil Gathering, 38 SCOT. J. POL.
ECON. 227 (1991); Jean-Francois Hennart, Upstream Vertical Integration in the Aluminum
and Tin lndustries, 9 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 281 (1988); Paul L. Joskow, Contract Dura
tion and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets, 77 AM
ECON. REV. 168 (1987); Paul L. Joskow, Price Adjustment in Long-term Contracts: The Case
of Coal, 31 J.L. & ECON. 47 (1988); Paul L. Joskow, Vertical Integration and Long-term
Contracts: The Case of Coal-burning Electric Generating Plants, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 33
(1985); Scott E. Masten & Keith J. Crocker, Efficient Adaptation in Long-Term Contracts:
Take-or-Pay Provisions for Natural Gas, 75 AM ECON. REV. 1083 (1985); J. Harold
Mulherin, Complexity in Long-term Contracts: An Analysis of Natural Gas Contractual Pro
visions, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 105 (1986); Russell Pittman, Specific Investments, Contracts,
and Opportunism: The Evolution of Railroad Sidetrack Agreements, 34 J.L. & ECON. 565
(1991); Pablo T. Spiller, On Vertical Mergers, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 285 (1985).
.

.

12 See Erin Anderson, Transaction Costs as Determinants of Opportunism in Integrated
and Independent Sales Forces, 9 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 247 (1988); Erin Anderson &
Anne T. Coughlan, International Market Entry and Expansion via Independent or Integrated
Channels of Distribution, 51 J. MARKETING 71 (1987); Erin Anderson & David C.
Schmittlein, Integration of the Sales Force: An Empirical Examination, 15 RAND J. ECON.
385 (1984); Jan B. Heide & George John, The Role of Dependence Balancing in Safeguard
ing Transaction-Specific Assets in Conventional Channels, 52 J. MARKETING 20 (1988);
George John & Barton A. Weitz, Forward Integration into Distribution: An Empirical Test
of Transaction Cost Analysis, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 337 (1988); Gary L. Lilien, Advisor 2:
Modeling the Marketing Mix Decision for Industrial Products, 25 MGMT. SCI. 191 (1979).
13. See Henry Ogden Armour & David J. Teece, Vertical Integration and Technological
Innovation, 62 REV. ECON. & STAT. 470 (1980); Marvin B. Lieberman, Determinants of Ver
tical Integration: An Empirical Test, 39 J. INDUS. ECON. 451 (1991); Scott E. Masten et al.,
Vertical Integration in the U.S. Auto Industry: A Note on the Influence of Transaction Spe
cific Assets, 12 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 265 (1989); Kirk Monteverde & David J. Teece,
Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry, 13 BELL J.
ECON. 206 (1982); Gary P. Pisano, Using Equity Participation to Support Exchange: Evi
dence from the Biotechnology Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 109 (1989).
14. See Keith J. Crocker & Kenneth J. Reynolds, The Efficiency of Incomplete Con
tracts: An Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine Procurement, 24 RAND J. ECON. 126
(1993).
15. See Scott E. Masten, The Organization of Production: Evidence from the Aerospace
Industry, 27 J.L. & ECON. 403 (1984).
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more ordinary industries, however, observers have found much less
evidence of physical-asset specificity.16
Consistent with the difficulty in finding widespread evidence of the
ties between physical-asset specificity and governance, the GM-Fisher
Body story raises its own problems as well. If relation-specific dies
were the problem, GM could have mitigated it contractually by own
ing the dies itself - a tactic modem car companies routinely use.17 So
long as it owned and could repossess the dies, it faced little more risk
through contract than it did through vertical integration.
More basically, by 1919 GM already held a majority interest in
Fisher Body anyway.18 Absent any unusual arrangement, as a control
ling shareholder, GM could have appointed the entire board and,
through the board, could have mandated all policy.19 Whether the
coaches were steel or wood and whether GM owned the dies or Fisher
Body did, neither GM nor Fisher Body would have faced the risk of
any opportunism justifying an otherwise non-cost-justified merger be
tween of the two firms.
Indeed, GM seems to have done perfectly well with independent
suppliers for other specialized products. A.O. Smith, for example, was
already making automobile frames for GM and others in the early
1930s. Half a century later, A.O. Smith was still the largest automo
bile frame manufacturer, was still independent, and still had GM as a
principal customer. "Major model changes involve[d] substantial ex-

16. See Kirk Monteverde & David J. Teece, Appropriable Rents and Quasi-Vertical In
tegration, 25 J.L. & ECON. 321 (1982), however, find that it does lead the buyer to retain title

to the dedicated physical asset used in the production process. Other studies claiming to lo
cate evidence of physical-asset specificity include David T. Levy, The Transactions Cost Ap

proach to Vertical Integration: An Empirical Examination, 61 REV. ECON. & STAT. 438
(1985) (claiming that advertising intensity proxies for RSis); Ian C. MacMillan et al., Uncer
tainty Reduction and the Threat of Supplier Retaliation: Two Views of the Backward Integra
tion Decision, 7 ORG. STUD. 263 (1986) (using multi-industry "Profit Impact of Market
Strategies" database); Thomas M. Palay, Comparative Institutional Economics: The Gov
ernance of Rail Freight Contracting, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 265 (1984) (discussing idiosyncratic
freight cars).
17. On the GM-owning-the-die tactic, see, for example, WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra note 1, at 95; Masten et al., supra note 3; Monteverde
& Teece, supra note 16. Klein himself acknowledges this point in Benjamin Klein, Vertical
Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Re·
visited, 4 J .L. ECON. & ORG. 199, 205 (1988).
18. See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Influence, in THE NATURE OF THE
ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 61 (Williamson & Winter eds., 1991); Klein et
al., supra note 1, at 308 n.25.
19. Others have claimed that the Fisher brothers controlled this stock through a voting
trust. Although that would indeed have removed GM's voting control, in most states the
disability would have been temporary. State statutes generally limit the terms of voting
trusts to 10 years or less, which would have ended the Fisher Body trust by 1929 at the latest.
See ROBERT CHARI.Es CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 777 (1986); HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R.

ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 531-32
(1983). In fact, Casadesus-Masanell & Spurber, supra note 7, at 80, point out that the actual
Fisher Body voting trust ended in 1924.
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penses by A.O. Smith for new tooling, the arrangement of production
lines and learning time for production employees," reports Ronald
Coase, but contractual and reputational constraints kept opportunism
to manageable levels.20
C.

Japan

Despite the apparent shortage of evidence showing widespread
extra-contractual governance mechanisms driven by large physical
asset specificities, RSis have played an increasingly prominent part in
academic discussions of Japan. The story begins with the late Banri
Asanuma. Asanuma devoted much of the 1980s to studying the auto
mobile industry, and throughout the decade reported his results in
both Japanese and English. He also maintained a long-standing inter
est in Williamson's work, translating Markets and Hierarchies into
Japanese.21
According to Asanuma, the relationship between Japanese auto
mobile assemblers and suppliers is long-standing, and long-standing
for reasons that closely reflect the Williamson-Klein-Crawford
Alchian logic. First, the parties trade in "customized parts." Second,
the parties can produce these customized parts efficiently only by in
vesting in "relation-specific skills." Third, through those skills they
produce a "relational quasi rent" and - to return to the original point
- that rent creates an incentive to maintain the relationship long
term. How the parties prevent the rent-seeking and rent-avoidance
activities that trouble Williamson and Klein-Crawford-Alchian,
Asanuma seems not to have addressed.22
Relying in part on Asanuma's field work, Masahiko Aoki similarly
argues that Japanese manufacturers and subcontractors rely on RSis.23
Subcontractors invest heavily, explains Aoki, in skills that are specific
to their relationship with a given manufacturer. To make money on
such investments, a subcontractor must be able to expect long-term
returns. By the logic of Williamson and Klein-Crawford-Alchian, the
insecurity inherent in the appropriability of the quasi rents should

20. See Coase, supra note 18, at 71-72. Perhaps reflecting some of these issues, Klein
switched much of his explanation for the 1926 merger to human-capital investments ten
years after the original article. See Klein, supra note 17, at 208.
21. See Banri Asanuma, Nihon ni okeru meekaa to sapuraiyaa to no kankei [The Manu
facturer-Supplier Relationship in Japan}, in SAPURAIYAA SffiSUTEMU [SUPPLIER SYSTEM] 1,
37 n.* (Takahiro Fujimoto et al. eds., 1998). The translation appeared as SHI.JO TO KIGYO
SOSffiKI [MARKETS AND FIRM ORGANIZATION] (1980).
22 See Banri Asanuma, Manufacturer-Supplier Relationships in Japan and the Concept
of Relation-Specific Skill, 3 J. JAPANESE & lNT'L ECON. 1 (1989).
23. See MAsAHIKO AOia, INFORMATION, INCENTIVES, AND BARGAINING IN THE JAPANESE
ECONOMY 216-17 (1988); see also Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the
Japanese Firm, 28 J. ECON. LIT. 1 (1990).
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drive the subcontractor to merge with the manufacturer. In Japan,
they do not. This presents a puzzle to Aoki, who solves it by arguing
that Williamson and Klein-Crawford-Alchian overstate the problem of
opportunism and that, generally, a firm will keep its promises out of
concern for its own reputation.
Jeffrey H. Dyer finds the extensive use of RSis crucial to the very
success of the automobile industry in Japan, since they lead to "lower
costs, higher quality, and greater profits":
[A] key to the success of Japanese network relationships is the practice
of dedicating supplier assets to the customer. That is, Japanese auto
parts suppliers send engineers to work at the customer's site, locate
plants near the customer, or invest in customized physical assets.24

told, concludes Dyer, "dedicated assets provide Japanese manu
facturers with substantial competitive advantages."25
This analysis also appears in legal scholarship. In an intriguing re
cent study of Japanese cross-shareholdings, leading corporate law
scholars Ronald Gilson and Mark Roe argue that firms buy stock in
each other when they make heavy RSis in each other.26 Where Aoki
primarily stresses the relationship-specific human capital investments,
Gilson-Roe suggest that Japanese production (including the automo
bile industry) involves high degrees of all three Williamsonian RSis:
human-capital specificity, site specificity, and even physical-asset
specificity.
Like other scholars in this tradition, Gilson and Roe note that RSis
generate appropriable quasi rents. Where Aoki argued that reputa
tional effects largely prevent opportunism, however, Gilson and Roe
tum to the cross-shareholdings. Because (they argue) Japanese busi
ness groups (namely, the keiretsu) often own controlling interests in
manufacturing firms, groups can collectively control their members.
Should any one member behave opportunistically, the group can col
lectively intervene. The RSis in the industry are large, in short, and
generate distinctive extra-contractual governance arrangements.27

All

24. Jeffrey H. Dyer, Dedicated Assets: Japan's Manufacturing Edge, HARV. Bus. REV.
Nov.-Dec.1994, at 174, 174.
25. Id.
26. See Ronald J.Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps
Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE LJ. 871, 884 {1993).
A similar argument is made in David Flath, The Keiretsu Puzzle, 10 J. JAPANESE & INT'L
ECON. 101 (1996). An assertion similar to that made by Gilson & Roe is also made in J.
Mark Ramseyer, Cross-shareholding in the Japanese Keiretsu, in CONVERGENCE IN
CORPORATE LAW: THE EMERGING QUESTIONS {forthcoming 2000). Not to put too fine a
point on it, the claim here is that the argument about the automobile industry in Ramseyer,
supra, is wrong.
27. See Gilson & Rose, supra note 26.
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THE INDUSTRY

Introduction

Such is the theory. The question is how much of the governance
patterns in the Japanese automobile industry it actually explains. We
confess to being skeptical. What we know of the industry suggests that
RSis are modest, and what we know of Japanese contracting practice
suggests that the parties could solve most of their problems by con
tract.28 RSI theory, however, posits that parties will negotiate extra
contractual governance mechanisms primarily when they find large
RSis juxtaposed with significant barriers to contract.
To begin to examine these issues, we pose two necessarily interre
lated empirical questions: (a) whether assemblers and suppliers make
large RSis; and (b) whether any RSis they make lead to extra
contractual governance arrangements. We are the first to admit that
we lack direct measures of RSis. We do, however, have a variety of
indirect measures (however imperfect). In this Article, we combine
them with an investigation of when and how the parties negotiate what
sort of extra-contractual governance mechanisms.
B.

Subcontracting at Hondd29
1.

Introduction

To give a feel for the industry, we begin this analysis of Japanese
subcontracting by describing five firms in the Honda network. We re
alize that the statistically inclined will be impatient with the discursive
account. Because much of the misunderstanding about the industry
results from the way most scholars understandably lack an intuitive
sense of the "shop floor," however, we begin with some anecdotes.

28. Contracts could potentially solve the problems whether enforced through the courts
or through reputational mechanisms. On reputational sanctions in the industry, see
YOSmRO MIWA, FIRMS AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION IN JAPAN 75-76 (1996).
29. Generally in this Section, we rely on NlliON RODO KENKYU KIKO, SANGYO
BUNGYO KOZO TO RODO SHIJO NO KAISO SEI [THE STRUCTURE OF THE DIVISION OF
LABOR IN PRODUCTION, AND THE CLASS STRUCTURE OF THE LABOR MARKET] (1992), as
well as conversations with the original investigators. We update the data through FuYuMr
MrYosm, JIDOSHA GYOKAI HAYAWAKARI MAPPU [EASY-TO-READ MAP OF THE
AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY] (1999); NlliON KEIZAI SIDMBUN SHA, NIKKEI KAISHA JOHO
[NIKKEI COMPANY INFORMATION] (relevant years); and SHUKAN TOYO KEIZAI, KIGYO
KEIRETSU SORAN [OVERVIEW OF FIRM KEIRETSU] (relevant years) where appropriate. For
information on the supplier system generally, see MlWA, supra note 28, at§ 4.2. On the lack
of important government aid to the industry, see John Creighton Campbell, The Automobile
Industry and Public Policy, in THE AMERICAN AND JAPANESE AUTO INDUSTRIES IN
TRANsmoN 79 (Robert E. Cole & Taizo Yakushiji eds., 1984).
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The points we make are not unique to Honda. Instead, they apply to
contracting relationships in other manufacturing networks as well.30
Founded a half century ago; Honda conquered the motorcycle
world in the 1960s.31 It remains near the apex of that industry, and
now stands as Japan's third largest automobile producer. Where
Toyota sold 3.2 million cars in 1998 and Nissan 1.6 million cars, Honda
sold 1.2 million. Where Toyota had 1998 sales of 7.8 trillion yen and
Nissan 3.5 trillion yen, Honda had sales of 3.1 trillion yen. Where
Toyota had a workforce of 70,000 and Nissan 40,000, Honda had a
workforce of 29,000.
Honda buys components from approximately 280 firms. It main
tains long-term ties with about eighty of these, and has equity stakes in
a third of the eighty. It pays its suppliers amounts equal to about 80%
of its sales. In many cases, these subcontractors are substantial firms
in their own right: Keihin (carburetors, fuel injection systems; sales of
144 billion yen and 4,000 employees), for example, or Nippon seiki
(gauges; 87 billion sales and 1,700 employees), and Yutaka giken (ex
haust systems; 72 billion sales and 1,100 employees).
Honda buys shock absorbers from three firms, but relies most
heavily on A1•32 With sales of 103 billion yen and 2,800 employees, A1
is one of Honda's largest subcontractors. In tum, A1 buys from over
200 suppliers. Many of Ai's suppliers (the steel producers, for in
stance, or rubber) are large and do not rely heavily on A1 sales. Oth
ers (like the stamping and machining firms that make peripheral
products) are much smaller.
Generally, A1 buys peripherals from eight stamping and thirteen
machining companies. Of the eight stamping firms, three sell less than
20% of their output to A1, two sell 40-60%, and three sell over 60%.
Of eleven machining firms (we lack data on two), three sell under 10%
of their output to A1, two sell 10-30%, three sell 50-60%, and three sell
over 70%.
Among these second-tier subcontractors, B1 runs stamping opera
tions and B2 machining operations. In tum, B1 buys from sixty-two
suppliers, and B2 from fifteen. Among these third-tier subcontractors,
C1 does spot-welding jobs and C2 stamping work, both for B1• We be
gin with these third-tier firms and tum then to the second- and finally
the first-tier.

30. Discussions of the Nissan network in Rono, supra note 29, reflect this, and Miwa's
own interviews confirm this. Contrary to many claims, the contracting practices by the firms
in the industry (including Toyota) are standard and used routinely by firms in a variety of
other industries as well. See MIWA, supra note 28, at 64-68. To test the common Toyota-is
different hypothesis, we add a Toyota dummy in the regressions below.
31. See MIWA, supra note 28, at 64.
32. Because of the assurances of confidentiality the original researchers gave their inter
viewees, we do not identify the firms involved in the following examples.
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Third-tier Subcontractors

C1• Established in 1968 as a welding operation, C1 initially con
sisted of the president, his wife, and two part-time employees. To
gether, they produced television parts. They started selling to B1 in
1985, and by 1989 had annual sales of 78 million yen, eleven workers,
and seventeen welding machines. The firm now sells half its output to
B1• The rest of its output involves electrical equipment, water heaters,
and automobile accessories like audio and lighter parts.
On the 27th or 28th of each month, B1 gives C1 the next month's
order plan. Twice a day, it sends a truck with the materials for C1 to
weld and picks up any finished work.
For all practical purposes, only the president at C1 has any engi
neering expertise. Of the eleven workers, three are family members
and eight are nonfamily employees with less than ten years' experi
ence. When faced with a new product from B1, the president person
ally determines the technical specifications of the manufacturing proc
ess: what voltage to set for the weld, for instance, how much time to
use, and what pressure to apply. After he does, the employees follow
his instructions.
C:zo Firm C2 began in 1973 with five workers. For several years, it
did stamping work for air conditioners and vending machines. As de
mand fell the president asked B1 for work. When B1 agreed, C2 bought
the new equipment necessary. Within a year, it had fifteen employees
and sent 70% of its work to B1•
Of the fifteen people at C2, three are family members, five are full
time employees, and seven are part-time. The work is sufficiently
simple that virtually any employee can do it with little experience. B1
pays C2 on a piece-rate basis, and charges it for the supplies and
stamping dies it needs.
C2 sends some of its work (10-20% of its sales) to four other firms.
These fourth-tier subcontractors too are mostly family operations.
Typically, they have one or two non-family employees.
3.

Second-tier Subcontractors

B1• The creation of an ex-Nakajima Aircraft employee, B1 began in
1947. Initially, it produced agricultural machines, but in 1954 took up
stamping work. It adopted its current corporate status in 1962, and
began selling door-handle parts two years later.
In 1971, B1 began doing stamp work for A1• By 1984, it had eighty
five employees (including seven part-time) and sales of 2.13 billion
yen. It pays its suppliers amounts equal to 40% of its sales. It sells
two-fifths of its output to A1 and two-fifths to another firm that incor
porates the work into brake assemblies bound for Honda. The re
maining fifth it sells elsewhere. It owns its own stamp presses.
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When A1 and B1 negotiate a new job, they set the expected quan
tity and price, and calculate a depreciation charge for the stamp dies.
On the 20th of each month,A1 announces its projected demand for the
next ninety days. Within each month, when necessary, it can change
orders on five days' notice.
B:zo As of 1987, second-tier subcontractor B2 had fifty-five employ
ees and 667 million yen in sales. Established in 1964, it had started as
a machining firm for a textile machine producer. Because the presi
dent knew the president of first-tier subcontractor, X, it shifted to
automobile parts the next year.
In 1970, with fifteen to sixteen employees, B2 began trading with
A1• At the time, X had no objection to its doing so. When B2's orders
fromA1 began to rival its sales to X, X still did not object. By 1987, B2
sold half of its output toA1•
B2 specializes in precision machining. Of its fifty-five employees,
thirty-seven are "regular" employees (twenty-seven male and ten fe
male; twenty-seven full-time and ten part-time). Of the twenty-seven
full-time regular employees, twenty have less than ten years' experi
ence.
The part-time employees are primarily housewives from nearby
farms. They do the same labor-intensive manufacturing work as their
full-time counterparts. Although the company would prefer that they
worked full-time, they remain part-time to preserve the option of
staying home during the peak agricultural work season.
In 1987, B2 hired a retired A1 director as a technical advisor. He
advised the firm twice a week on equipment investment, negotiations
withAu and assorted other managerial issues. B2 holds title to its own
equipment. It buys from its own subcontractors products worth a
quarter of its total sales.
4.

First-tier SubcontractorA1

Founded in 1938, A1 began by manufacturing aircraft parts. In
1953, it switched to motorcycle shock absorbers for the young Honda
firm. When Honda moved into automobiles, A1 followed. In 1970, it
experienced financial problems, and Honda responded by buying an
equity stake (now 35.8% ). It has since listed its stock on the Tokyo
Stock Exchange. Its president and about half its directors are from
Honda.
A1 currently makes shock absorbers and a variety of other air- and
oil-pressure-related goods. By product, 61% of its 1998 sales go to
cars or trucks, 33% to motorcycles, and 8% to boats. By buyer, 72%
of its sales go to Honda, 8% to Suzuki, and smaller amounts to such
firms as Kawasaki, Yamaha, Fuji Heavy Industries (maker of
Subarus), Mazda, and Mitsubishi Auto. Purchases from its own sup
pliers count for about 63% of its sales.
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Ai regularly designs products in collaboration with Honda and
sends its people to Honda as guest engineers. In developing these new
products, Ai and Honda generally ignore the lower-tier subcontractors
(who, as the discussion above suggests, lack much engineering exper
tise anyway).
Honda models are subject to a four-year product cycle, with minor
annual changes. Many of Ai's products are subject to the annual
changes.
C. Industry-wide Data33
1.

Firm Size

We turn now from this discursive account to aggregate statistics on
the industry and consider first some information on firm size (Section
1) and supplier associations (Section 2). Although (as the account
above implies) many second- and third-tier suppliers are small, some
first-tier suppliers are larger even than a few of the assemblers.34 As
noted earlier, Toyota has 70,000 employees and annual sales of 7.8
trillion yen. Mazda has only 24,000 employees and 1.5 trillion yen in
sales; Suzuki has 14,000 employees and 1.2 trillion yen sales; and
Daihatsu has 11,000 employees and 783 billion yen sales.
By comparison, Denso (maker of air-conditioning and other auto
mobile-industry electrical units) has 40,000 employees and sales of 1.3
trillion yen. Asahi Glass has 8,000 employees and 855 billion yen in
sales; Aishin seiki (running gear) has 12,000 employees and 521 billion
yen sales; and Kyocera (high-tech ceramics) has 13,000 employees and
492 billion yen in sales. Indeed, several first-tier suppliers are multi
national conglomerates that swamp the smaller automobile assem
blers: Hitachi (69,000 employees and annual sales of 4.1 trillion yen),
Toshiba (66,000 employees and 3.7 trillion yen in sales), and
Matsushita Electric (46,000 employees and 4.9 trillion yen in sales).
Nor should one think suppliers simply make ashtrays and brakes
for Toyota and Honda to bolt onto their cars. Sometimes the "assem
bler" out-sources even the assembly itself. A "Toyota" car, for exam
ple, might well have been assembled by Toyoda Automatic Loom,
33. In this Section and elsewhere, we obtain general information on firm sales, employ
ees, and the like from NIHON KEIZAI, supra note 29; TOYO KEIZAI, supra note 29; NIHON
KEIZAI SHIMBUN SHA, KAISHA SORAN [ANNUAL CORPORATION REPORTS) (relevant vol
umes and years); NIHON NO JIDOSHA BUHIN KOGYO (1998 NEN BAN) [JAPANESE
AUTOMOTIVE PARTS INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, 1998] (Nihon jidosha buhin kogyo kai &
Oto toreedo jaaneru eds., 1998) [hereinafter JAPIA]; TOYO KEIZAI SlilMPOSHA, SIDKIHO:
MuOJO GAISHA BAN [SEASONAL REPORTS: UNLISTED COMPANIES] (relevant years).
34. These are not mutually exclusive categories. The same supplier may be a first-tier
supplier with respect to one assembler but a second- or third-tier supplier with respect to
another. Teikei kikaki sells both to Aisan kogyo (a supplier) and to Yamaha (an assembler);
Aisan sells directly to Toyota (an assembler) but also to Denso (a supplier).
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Toyota Auto Body, or Kanto Automobile Works. All told, Toyota
consigns the entire assembly of nearly half its cars. At times in its his
tory, Toyota even consigned the development of some of its cars to
other firms.35
We have less data on the second-, third-, or fourth-tier suppliers.
The Japan Automotive Parts Industry Association ("JAPIA") does
not maintain a list of these suppliers, and even if it did their small size
would make information on them hard to collect. The annual gov
ernment Census of Manufactures, however, does collect data on manu
facturing establishments (each plant within a firm is a separate unit),
and this census confirms the small size of most automobile supplier
plants. In Table 1, we give plant size in the transportation equipment
sector. Of the 7,533 establishments, 4,236 (56%) have ten to twenty
nine employees. Only 128 establishments (1.7%) have more than
1,000.36

2.

Supplier Associations

Most assemblers maintain associations of first-tier suppliers.37 The
suppliers in these associations meet from time to time to exchange in
formation with each other and with the assembler. Obviously, suppli
ers will find membership most worthwhile if they are producing cus
tomized goods for the supplier. Toyota, for example, has 189 suppliers
in its network, Nissan has 234, and Mitsubishi 377.

35. See Haruhito Shiomi, The Formation of Assembler Networks in the Automobile In·
dustry: The Case of Toyota Motor Company (1955-1980), in FORDISM 'TRANSFORMED: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCTION METHODS IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 28, 30-31
(Haruhito Shiomi & Kazuo Wada eds., 1995); KANTO JIDOSHA KOGYO, KANTO JIDOSHA
KOGY040 NENSHI (40-YEAR HISTORY OF KANTOJIDOSHA KOGYO] 118, 153 (1986).
36. HEISEi 9 NEN, KOGYO TOKEI HYO: SANGYO HEN (CENSUS OF MANUFACTURES:
REPORT BYINDUSTRY, 1997] (Tsusho sangyo sho ed., 1999). Not all data are available bro
ken down at the three-digit sectors. However, of the 13,518 establishments in the two-digit
transportation equipment sector, 9,964 are from the three-digit automotive sector; of the
907,000 employees in the two-digit sector, 770,476 are in the three-digit automotive sector.

The correlation coefficients between the two-digit transportation and three-digit automotive
sectors are: (a) for distribution of employees, by establishment size
99.96%; and (b) for
distribution of establishments, by establishment size
99.97%.
-

-

37. On supplier associations, see MIWA, supra note 28, at 70-72. In several cases, the
assembler maintains more than one association. Toyota, for example, has three associations
divided on the basis of geography. Honda does not maintain a formal association; here, we
use its list of suppliers instead. For our database, we rely on the 1998 JAPIA list of 1,649
firms . See JAPIA, supra note 33. The list primarily includes JAPIA members but includes
some prominent non-member parts manufacturers and excludes some members who do not
make parts (e.g., scrap dealers) or wholesalers who deal primarily in other goods. See id. at
251.
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ESTABLISHMENT SIZE AND lNvESTMENT LEVELS IN THE
TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT SECTOR (1997)

A
Estab. size
(emp's)
10-29
30-49
50-99
100-199
200-299
300-499
500-999
1000-

B

c

Capital

Employees

D
Establishments

76,410
39,093
72,251
80,549
48,422
72,940
116,503
363,618

4,236
1,000
1,032
589
198
186
164
128

302,800
192,900
421,900
547,900
373,700
637,400
1,160,700
3,766,900

B/C

BID

3.96
4.93
5.84
6.80
7.72
8.74
9.96
10.36

71.5
192.9
408.8
930.2
1,887.4
3,426.9
7,077.4
29,428.9

Notes: Capital is in million yen, excluding land.
Establishments are those in the 2-digit transportation equipment sector.
Source: HEISEi 9 NEN, KOGYO TOKE! HYO: SANGYO HEN [CENSUS OF
MANUFACTURES: REPORT BYINDUSTRY, 1997] (Tsusho sangyo sho ed., 1999).

Observers frequently cite these associations as evidence of auto
mobile ip.dustry "keiretsu," and assume that the groups are exclusive.
In fact, they are anything but. Consider a simple correlation matrix of
association membership. Yamaha, Suzuki, and Honda also make mo
torcycles, and thus draw on a different set of suppliers. Among the
other assemblers, however, all correlation coefficients except one are
above 0.20, and among Subaru, Daihatsu, and Mazda all coefficients
are above 0.50. Even the membership correlation coefficient for ar
chrivals Toyota and Nissan is 0.22. Put another way, of the 189 Toyota
and 234 Nissan association members, sixty-eight suppliers are in both
associations.38
Or consider the following: 1,098 firms are in one or more of the
Toyota, Nissan, Mitsubishi, Subaru, Mazda, Daihatsu, Hino, Isuzu,
Yamaha, Suzuki, and Honda networks.39 Among these firms, the
mean association membership is 1.91. Seven hundred thirty-eight
firms are in only one association; 135 are in two associations; 135 are
in three-to-five associations; sixty-two are in six-to-eight associations,
and twenty-eight are in nine or more.
Nor are these associations peculiar to the assemblers. Many sup
pliers also maintain associations of their suppliers. For example,
Denso (air conditioners; 40,000 employees and 1,375 billion yen in
sales) has an association of sixty-seven suppliers; Koito (lighting
38. Toyota has a 20% equity interest in Hino and a 34% interest in Daihatsu. As one
might expect given this equity network, the correlation coefficients among the supplier asso
ciations for these three firms are higher - ranging from 0.30 to 0.44
39. The Honda network is not a formal organization like the others. However, we fol
low the categorization of JAPIA, supra note 33, which lists some firms as regular suppliers to
Honda.
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equipment; 4,600 employees and 148 billion yen in sales) has an asso
ciation of sixty-eight suppliers; Akebono Brake (2,900 employees and
108 billion yen in sales) has an association of seventy-nine suppliers;
and Kayaba (oil pressure equipment; 4,200 employees and 177 billion
yen in sales) has an association of 270 suppliers.40 More generally, of
the 373 firms on which the JAPIA provides data, 188 (50%) main
tained their own supplier associations. Among the firms with 500 or
fewer employees, the figure was 39% (sixty-two firms); among those
with 501-1,000 employees, 53% (forty-six firms); among those with
1,001-5,000 employees 67% (seventy-two firms); and among those
with 5,001 or more employees, 40% (eight firms).
Ill. RELATION-SPECIFIC !NVESTMENTS

A. Smaller Firms
The discussion of the Honda network suggests two preliminary
points about the level of RSis at the smaller suppliers. First, they in
vest very little in relationship-specific human capital. We know they
invest little in relationship-specific human capital because they invest
little in human capital at all. In many of these firms, only one or two
people know any engineering. The other employees are so new that if
they did have any expertise, it would be general rather than specific to
the firm or its partners.
Second, small as they are, the firms can and do sell to buyers in
several distinct industries. Not only do they not sell to a single firm,
they do not even sell to a single industry. Depending on their niche,
they stamp, they machine, they assemble, they weld. If the price is
right, they will stamp, machine, assemble, and weld Honda-bound
products. But they can apparently do the same for aircraft, air condi
tioners, boats, textile equipment, television sets, and vending ma
chines.
Loosely to be sure, industry-wide data confirm these impressions.
First, employee tenure at the small firms is notoriously short. Con
sider data from the government's annual census of wages (Figure 1).41
Among the smallest firms (those in the two-digit transportation
equipment sector with ten to ninety-nine employees), nearly 40% of
40. See NIHON DENSO, NIHON DENSO 25 NEN SHI [A 25-YEAR HISTORY OF NIHON
DENSO] 243-44 {1974); Karro SEISAKUSHO, Karro SEISAKUSHO 70 NEN SHI [A 70-YEAR
HISTORY OF Karro SEISAKUSHO] 42 {1985); AKEBONO BUREEKI, HANSEIKI NO AYUMI [A
HALF CENTURY OF PROGRESS] 347 {1979); KAYABA KOGYO, KAYABA KOGYO 50 NEN SHI
[A 50-YEAR HISTORY OF KAYABA KOGYO] 284-86 {1986).
41. See RODOSHO, CHINGIN SENSASU, HEISEi 9 NEN CHINGIN KOZO KIHON TOKE!
CHOSA [BASIC SURVEY ON wAGE STRUCTURE 1997] {1998). In compiling this figure, we

use data provided to us by the ministry, which breaks down industry into smaller categories
than those used for the final published survey.
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the workers have been at the firm for less than four years. Another
20-odd percent have worked there five to ten years. Even among the
firms with 100-999 employees, half have less than ten years' tenure.
Second, the small firms lack substantial physical-asset investments
of any sort, much less relationship-specific physical assets (Table 1).
At the smallest plants, capital investment per employee is a mere 4
million yen - at 120 yen/dollar, about $33,000. Even among plants
with 200-300 employees, the figure approaches only 7.8 million yen, or
about $65,000.
Finally, as we explain in more detail immediately below, among
automobile suppliers of all sizes, most technology is general rather
than specific. Those investments that are specific, in turn, are specific
not to a relationship but to a model. As such, they necessarily have, at
most, four years' duration.
FIGURE 1: EMPLOYEE TENURE IN THE TRANSPORTATION
EQUIPMENT SECTOR (1997)
Employee Tenure, by Firm Size
0.4
0.35
0.3
....

-- L-All, in %

0.25

--- L-Male, in %

c
Q)
u
0.2
..
Q)
Cl. 0.15

M-PJl, in %
-:' <-M-Male, in %
->tE-S-All, in %

0.1

--s-Male, in %

0.05
0
04 yr

5-9 yr

10-14 yr 15-19 yr 20-24 yr 25-29 yr
Employee Tenure

Note: L - firms with 1,000 or more employees; M -firms with 100-999 employees; S
- firms with 10-99 employees.
Source: RODOSHO, CHINGIN SENSASU, HEISEi 9 NEN CHINGIN KOZO KIHON TOKEI
CHOSA [BASIC SURVEY ON WAGE STRUCTURE 1997] (1998). In compiling this figure, we
use data provided to us by the ministry that disaggregate the industry into categories smaller
than those used for the final published survey.
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B. Larger Firms
1.

The Logic

Given this lack of substantial investments among second- and
third-tier suppliers, if any suppliers in the Japanese automobile indus
try have large RSis, they must be among the larger first-tier suppliers.
At least there, according to Table 1 and Figure 1, the levels of capital
investment are relatively high and employee tenures long. At least
there, physical assets could be substantial and relationship-specific,
employees could have significant relationship-specific expertise, and
those investments could affect the governance arrangements the firms
adopt. And at least there, the assemblers sometimes make equity in
vestments: as we show in Table 4, the probability that an assembler
invests in a supplier increases with supplier size.
Yet even here, basic logic should give one pause. First, these firms
make products common to all cars everywhere. All cars have wind
shields, shock absorbers, headlights, seats, piston rings, and cigarette
lighters. They may come in different sizes and different shapes, but if
a supplier can make these sorts of products for one assembler, it could
probably make them for another assembler.
Put another way, any asset-specificity in production seems model
specific rather than relationship-specific. Suppose a supplier needs to
invest in idiosyncratic equipment or training to make Camry-bound
tail lights. If those investments would not transfer to Accord-bound
tail lights, they probably would not transfer to Corolla-bound ones ei
ther.42
Second, any model-specific investments are short-lived. For most
assemblers, a model lasts only four years. As a result, even if a sub
contractor does own a specialized asset, it usually will not generate
quasi rents long-term. Instead, it will generate them for four years at
most. Yet the subcontractors sign contracts with the assembler that
last for the term of the model. If any firm earns model-specific quasi
rents on its investments, it can readily protect them by contract and by
the prospect of market competition at the end of the model cycle.
Third, by simple geography and component size, even any site
specificities should be minor. Japan is small, and so are most compo
nents. The entire country covers roughly the size of California, and
Toyota city is a scant 200 miles from Tokyo. Other than car bodies
and completed engines, moreover, most automobile parts are easy to
ship. Given the elaborate networks of railroads and super highways,

42. As implied in Asanuma's own discussion. See Asanuma, supra note 22, at 4.
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suppliers everywhere should be able cost-effectively to deliver com
ponents to assemblers anywhere.43
Fourth, if the biggest companies potentially have the largest RSis,
they are also the ones least likely to let that specificity affect funda
mental aspects of governance like equity ownership. They are simply
too big and too diversified. Among the suppliers, take the 248 stock
exchange listed firms These firms maintain memberships in a mean
3.2 supplier associations. Or take the firms for which we have data on
sales to automobile assemblers (again, about 250). On average, these
firms sell about half their output to their lead customers in the auto
mobile industry. Even if such firms did make large RSis, they would
rarely want to structure their basic governance mechanisms to deal
with firms buying only half their output.
.

2.

Cross-shareholdings

a. Introduction. Tum from these broad impressions to firm-level
data on the first-tier suppliers. To explore the role that RSis play in
this environment, we first identify those contractual ties where logic
predicts large RSis would most likely exist, if they exist anywhere. We
then ask whether the parties to those ties negotiate the extra
contractual governance mechanisms (like equity investments) that RSI
theory dictates.
Note the limits inherent in this exercise. Necessarily, we examine a
composite hypothesis: (i) that RSis are large enough to create signifi
cant problems of opportunism, (ii) that contractual solutions to such
problems are infeasible, and (iii) that the RSis and contracting prob
lems lead to the predicted governance mechanisms. Suppose that, de
spite having good proxies for RSis, we fail to observe the predicted
governance mechanisms.
In itself, that result would not tell us
whether the hypothesis failed because RSis were small, because con
tracts worked, or because RSI theory did not apply. Note too that we
ask readers to table the social scientific custom of focusing on regres
sions as the key test in an article. To us at least, the most relevant ma
terial on RSis is the least technical: that which we obtain by observa
tion and industry-wide data. We present the regressions below only as
supplementary evidence.
We reason that in the automobile industry, as in most industries,
large RSis most likely will exist in transactions in which suppliers have
close, exclusive (or nearly exclusive) ties to a given assembler. Sup43. The high cost to consumers of shipping materials around Japan through the com
mercial transportation industry is irrelevant. Automobile assemblers are large enough that
if such shippers (whether because of regulatory restrictions or because of cartelization)
charge more than the average cost of transportation (a function only of tolls, fuel, driver
wages, and truck maintenance and repair), the assembler can provide the transportation
services in-house.
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pose that to produce a given part for Assembler A requires heavy,
idiosyncratic equipment. A could itself pay for the equipment, or
Supplier S could pay. Either way, in order to plan for the investment
A and S will communicate with each other extensively. Provided the
idiosyncratic investment generates returns to scale, they will also try to
maximize S's sales toA.
If production involves large RSis for which S pays, then by RSI
theory S will need protection against A's ex post opportunism. Inter
alia, it could try to obtain a controlling equity interest in A. This does
not happen. Even the largest Japanese suppliers do not buy control
ling interests in Toyota, Nissan, or even Suzuki.44 Neither do they
seem to negotiate other controls overA's governance.
Alternatively, assembler A could pay for the RSI. To prevent op
portunistic action by S, it might then negotiate a controlling equity in
terest in (or other control mechanisms over) S. Our testable hypothe
sis follows: if large RSis structure the Japanese automobile industry,
assemblers will tend to negotiate control over those suppliers who
have the closest ties with them.
b. The Test. To examine whether suppliers with the closest ties to
an assembler are subject to extra-contractual governance mechanisms,
we regress:
an assembler's equity investment in a supplier (both a dummy for in
vestments of 10% or more [SubEqlnv] and a continuous variable
[Eq%]), on
(i) the fraction of its output which that supplier sells to the assembler
(both a dummy for sales of 50% or more [SubSales] and a continuous
variable [Sales%]), and
(ii) whether the supplier is a member only of that assembler's supplier
association (LoneClub).

For controls, we include:
(x) a dummy for whether S lists its stock on an exchange (Listed),
(y) a dummy for whether S is a member of no supplier association
(NoClub), and
(z) as a measure of firm size, the number of employees at S (Employ·
ees).45

44. The exception may be Toyoda Automatic Loom, which assembles some Toyota
automobiles. This firm {founded by the father of the founder of Toyota Motor) antedates
Toyota Motor. It initially specialized in producing automated weaving machines for Japan's
booming pre-war cotton textile industry. With 5.1 % of the stock, it is the largest shareholder
of Toyota Motor; and Toyota Motor owns 24.7% of Toyoda Automatic Loom. In January
1999, Toyoda Automatic Loom's interest in Toyota Motor was worth about 560 billion yen;
Toyota Motor's interest in Automatic Loom was worth about 140 billion yen.
45. We also used total sales by the firm but did not generate substantially different re
sults.
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Because many observers claim that Toyota maintains unusually close
ties with its suppliers, we add a dummy for whether the assembler in
volved is Toyota (Toyota).46 We include more precise definitions of
the variables in Table 2, summary statistics and sources in Table 3, and
regression results in Table 4.

TABLE 2: REGRESSION VARIABLES - DEFINIDONS
Dir: 1 if the assembler that buys the largest fraction of a supplier's output has
a seat (including a seat held by a former assembler employee) on the supplier's
board of directors; 0 otherwise.
Employees: The number of full-time employees at a supplier.
Eq%: The percentage of a supplier's stock held by the assembler that buys
the largest fraction of the supplier's output.
Listed: 1 if a supplier lists its stock on either the Tokyo or Osaka Stock Ex
change; 0 otherwise.
LoneClub: 1 if a supplier is listed in JAPIA data as a member of only one as
sembler's supplier association; 0 otherwise.
NoClub: 1 if a supplier is listed in JAPIA data as a member of no supplier as
sociation; 0 otherwise.
NumDir: The number of directors that the assembler buying the largest frac
tion of a supplier's output has on the supplier's board (including seats held by
former assembler employees).
Sales%: The percentage of a supplier's output bought by the assembler that
buys the largest fraction of the supplier's output.
SubSales: 1 if a supplier sells 50% or more of its output to a single assembler;
0 otherwise.
SubEqlnv: 1 if the assembler that buys the largest fraction of a supplier's out
put owns 10% or more of the supplier's stock; 0 otherwise.
Toyota: 1 if the assembler that buys the largest fraction of the supplier's out
put is Toyota; 0 otherwise.

c. The Results. Perhaps the biggest surprise in Table 4 involves the
radically different effects that SubSales (and Sales%) and LoneClub
have. On the one hand, the coefficients to SubSales (and Sales%)
suggest that the parties d o adopt extra-contractual governance
mechanisms: the coefficients are consistently positive and significant
in regressions (a), (c), (d), and (f). On the other hand, the coefficients
on LoneClub suggest nothing of the sort: the coefficients are insignifi
cant in all specifications and do not even consistently have the same
sign.

46. According to Table 4, Toyota is distinctive only in that it is located in the same pre
fecture (Aichi) as many of its suppliers.
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TABLE 3: REGRESSION VARIABLES - SUMMARY STATISTICS

Dir
Employees
Eq%
Listed
LoneClub
No Club

NumDir
Sales%
SamePref
SubSales
SubEqlnv
Toyota

n

Min

Mean

Max

209
700
462
1,648
1,648
1,648
209
249
477
249
462
479

0
7
0
0
0
0
0
0.6
0
0
0
0

0.368
1,848
11.750
0.150
0.447
0.346
1.536
48.7
0.344
0.510
0.286
0.251

1
68,947
100
1
1
1
14
99.8
1
1
1
1

Sources: The data - when possible from 1998 - is variously assembled from the rele
vant years of NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN SHA, NIKKEI KAISHA JOHO [NIKKEi COMPANY
INFORMATION} {1998); SHUKANTOYO KEIZAI, KIGYO KEIRETSU SORAN {OVERVIEW OF
FIRM KEIRETSU} {1998); TOYO KEIZAI SHIMPOSHA, SHIKIHO: MIJOJO GA/SHA BAN
[SEASONAL REPORTS: UNLISTED COMPANIES] (relevant years); NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN
SHA, KAISHA SORAN [ANNUAL CORPORATION REPORTS} {1998); NIHON NO JIDOSHA BURIN
KOGYO (1998 NEN BAN) [JAPANESE AUTOMOTIVE PARTS INDUSTRY, 1998] (Nihon jidosha
buhin kogyo kai & Oto toreedo jaaneru eds., 1998).
The difference between SubSales and LoneClub is surprising, be
cause one might have thought that the variables would identify
roughly the same suppliers. One would have thought, for example,
that if S were affiliated only with A's supplier association (LoneCiub)
it would disproportionately sell to A (SubSales). The suppliers in
these associations meet from time to time to exchange information
with each other and with the assembler. Obviously, suppliers will find
membership most worthwhile if they are producing customized goods
for the supplier. If so, then the two variables would be heavily corre
lated and generate similar results in Table 4. In fact, the correlation
coefficient between the two is only 0.13.47
For our purposes, the resulting question becomes: If there were
significant RSis in the industry, would SubSales or LoneClub more
likely signify their presence? If the answer is SubSales, then Table 4
suggests that the transactions involve substantial RSis. If the answer
is LoneClub, then the very absence of equity investments suggests ei
ther that large RSis do not exist or that they do not structure govern
ance patterns.

47. Adding a variable interacting LoneClub and SubSales results in a significant, posi
tive coefficient on SubSales but insignificant coefficients for both LoneClub and the interac
tion term.
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TABLE 4: SALES DIVERSIFICATION AND EQUITY !NVESTMENTS
SubEqlnv
(b)

RHS:
(a)
SubSales

.421
(6.02)

(c)

NoClub
Toyota

.0001
(3.48)
.061
(0.74)
-.031
(0.19)
.052
(0.71)

.011
(0.22)
.00001
(2.07)
-.089
(1.86)
-.124
(153)
.085
(1.67)

-.067
(0.85)
.0001
(330)
.054
(0.65)
-.067
(0.42)
.039
(052)

0.19
248
Probit

0.02
462
Probit

0.19
248
Probit

Constant
Adjusted R2
n

.002
(2.49)
.860
(0.29)
1.86
(0.35)
2.298
(0.82)
-6.261
(1.91)

2.716
(1.24)
.0005
(157)
-5.678
(2.55)
-3.667
(0.97)
3.116
(134)
11.340
(5.93)

.358
(7.39)
.736
(0.26)
.002
(2.50)
.938
(031)
2.239
(0.41)
2.447
(0.86)
-6.554
(1.89)

0.23
248
OLS

0.02
462
OLS

022
248
OLS

.361
(7.65)

LoneClub

Listed

(f)

.435
(6.02)

Sales%

Employees

Eq%
(e)

(d)

Notes: For the OLS regressions, we give the coefficients, followed by the absolute value
of the t-statistics on the line below.
For probit regressions, we give the probability of a change in the dependent variable
given a one-unit change in the independent variable. We give the absolute value of the z
values for the underlying coefficients on the line below.
For probit regressions, we give the pseudo-R2 rather than the adjusted R2•
Sources: See Table 3.
Reasons linked to technological innovation suggest that LoneClub
more plausibly proxies for RSis than does SubSales. We discuss that
hypothesis in Subsection 3 below. We turn to the possibility that Sub·
Sales better proxies for RSis in Subsection 4.

3.

RSis and Technological Innovation

a. Introduction.

Firms that invest heavily in RSis will prefer to
deal with suppliers who avoid selling customized components to their
competitors. All else equal, off-the-shelf technology is cheaper than
new. As a result, firms will not invest in idiosyncratic technology un
less doing so generates a competitive advantage. If it does generate
that advantage, they (the investing firms) will want to do what they
can to keep that technology from their rivals.
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Once an investing firm's supplier sells similarly sophisticated prod
ucts to the investing firm's competitors, however, the odds increase
dramatically that the technology will leak. After all, given the new
improved technology, the supplier has an incentive to adapt the tech
nology in a way that will let it win business from those competitors.
Only by limiting its ties to suppliers who restrict their other custom
ized sales to buyers outside the industry can the investing firm slow
the technological leak. The conclusion: large RSis most likely will
exist (if they exist anywhere) in situations where the supplier sells cus
tomized components only to one automobile assembler.

b. An Example. Perhaps an illustration would help. Suppose a
subcontractor, with the aid of Toyota engineers, develops a new, more
cost-effective Camry shock absorber. Given that Nissan and Honda
do not use such a shock absorber (the technology is still secret, after
all), the production process is, by definition, specific to Toyota trades.
Like virtually all automobile parts, though, shock absorbers them
selves are common to all assemblers, and many technological innova
tions are not patentable. As a result, even if only Toyota cars were to
use this improved technology, the supplier could potentially win or
ders from Honda and Nissan by adapting it to Accords and Maximas.
Often, Toyota would want to keep this technology from its competi
tors.48 To lower the risk of a technological leak, in turn, it may have an
incentive to develop the new technology only with suppliers who do
not make customized components for those competitors.
What this logic ignores, of course, are those RSis that are simple
adaptations to model size and shape rather than real technological im
provements. For those RSis, the assembler will not worry about tech
nological leaks to competitors. No matter how mundane a shock ab
sorber it may be, a Maxima shock absorber will not fit an Accord. In
this sense, the technology behind any Maxima shock absorber is spe
cific to trades with Nissan, but it is also technology that Nissan will not
try to keep secret.
Crucially, however, for such size and shape specificities, the
amount of the RSI is also quite small. Given the essential inter
changeability of most shock-absorber technology, most suppliers who
now make Maxima shock absorbers will be able to shift production to
Accord shock absorbers with relative ease. They will incur some tran
sitional costs, to be sure, but probably little more than they would in
cur in shifting among Toyota models - from, for instance, a Camry
shock absorber to a Corolla shock absorber.
c. Technology and Table 4. Consider, then, the implications of this
analysis for the importance of SubSales and LoneCiub. Firm size held
48. Not always, of course. Sometimes Toyota is happy to let the supplier market it
elsewhere, in exchange for a lower price on the new technology.
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firms differ,

(a) sell customized products to multiple automobile assemblers, or
(b) sell customized products only to one automobile assembler and fill
the rest of their output with either general open-market products within
the automobile industry or products for buyers outside the industry.
To see this, consider several possibilities:
(i) SubSales = 1, LoneClub = 1 (30 firms). If most suppliers sold
primarily to one assembler and no one else, then for most suppliers
both SubSales and LoneClub would equal one. In Table 4, the two
variables would then have similar coefficients. They do not.

(ii) SubSales = 1, LoneClub = 0 (58 firms). Suppose a supplier sells
more than half its output to one assembler, but is a member of multi
ple supplier associations (SubSales = 1, LoneClub = 0). That it has ties
to other assemblers sufficiently close to justify association membership
indicates that it probably sells significant amounts (even if less than
half) of sophisticated, customized goods to others in the industry.

(iii) SubSales = 0, LoneClub = 1 (69 firms). By contrast, suppose a
supplier sells a low fraction of its sales to its principal automobile as
sembler buyer, but is a member only of one supplier association (Sub
Sales = 0, LoneClub = 1). That it has joined only one association sug
gests it produces few customized products for other assemblers in the
industry. That it nonetheless sells a high fraction of its output to other
firms suggests that it must either (i) be selling outside the industry, or
(ii) be selling non-customized goods to other assemblers.
(iv) The Result. Consequently, the factor driving the different co
efficients on SubSales and LoneCiub in Table 4 would seem to lie in
the degree of extra-industry (or noncustomized, intra-industry) sales.
If a supplier sells to firms other than its lead assembler buyer, does it
sell customized goods to other buyers in the industry? Or does it in
stead sell only either generally available open-market goods or cus
tomized goods to those outside the automobile industry? If produc
tion involves large RSis, then the assembler should prefer the latter
group of suppliers over the former. If so, the key variable for our pur
poses would be LoneClub rather than SubSales. From the coefficients
to LoneClub in Table 4, a simple bottom line then follows: RSis do
not explain equity cross-holdings in the automobile industry.

4.

Sales Diversification and RSis

We hesitate to push this interpretation too hard. Readers of ear
lier versions complained (perhaps justifiably) that in doing so we were
belittling inconvenient results. Might it not be, they asked, that the
lack of sales diversification did signal the presence of RSis, while the
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supplier associations were trivial social clubs? If the associations per
formed no significant information-transmission function, might the
lack of sales diversification not signal the presence of RSis after all?
And is not the stability of the relationships itself evidence of large
RSis?

a. Equity Investments. Perhaps - but in pursuing this line of at
tack one can easily miss several key bits of evidence. Most basically,
one can exaggerate the pervasiveness of the extra-contractual govern
ance mechanisms in place. More specifically, one can exaggerate the
pervasiveness of the cross-shareholdings in the industry. For in truth,
the level of cross-shareholdings is low.
We have equity ownership data on 462 suppliers (162 listed firms
and 300 unlisted). In 57% of the suppliers (262 firms) the lead auto
mobile assembler buyer owns no equity. In an additional 15% (sixty
eight firms), it owns under 10%. In only a quarter of the suppliers
does it have at least a 10% interest, and in only 5% does it own a ma
jority interest.
One might plausibly ask whether equity investments are not more
pervasive in the suppliers on whom we lack the data. After all, we
have data disproportionately on the larger firms. And yet, stock ex
change listing held constant, the assemblers are more likely to invest
in the larger firms than the smaller (as we will show in Table 4, regres
sions (a)-(c)). Thus our data, though they disproportionately derive
from the larger firms, give us reason to doubt that equity investments
are more common among suppliers as a whole.49
b. Sales diversification. One can also exaggerate the extent to
which suppliers fail to diversify their sales. We have sales data on 249
suppliers (firms with 67 to 11,574 employees; mean employees of
1,260). In only 127 of these firms (51% ) did the lead assembler buyer
buy 50% or more of the supplier's output. In only seventy-four (30%)
did it buy 70% or more.
Given that we disproportionately have information on the larger,
listed firms, here too we should worry about sample bias. Curiously,
stock listing held constant, the bigger firms are less likely to diversify
sales; more predictably, firm size held constant, the listed firms are
more likely to diversify sales:
Sales%

=

55.00 + 0.0011Employees - 24.35Listed + e,

(23.92)

(2.48)

(6.49)

where n = 249, the absolute value of the t-statistics are in parentheses,
and the adjusted R2 is 0.14.

49. Note, however, that the effect is still ambiguous: disproportionately, we have infor
mation on the listed firms, and regressions {b) and {d) suggest that, size held constant, the
assemblers are more likely to invest in unlisted firms.
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Because we have data disproportionately on the larger, listed
firms, the effect among suppliers as a whole is hard to predict. Other
surveys (Table 5) indicate that the smaller, unlisted firms tend to di
versify less than the larger firms. Bear in mind, however, both that
these smaller firms produce a relatively minor fraction of the industry
output and that even they diversify significantly. According to Table
5, for instance, firms with less than 10 billion yen in sales constitute the
smallest 40% of the firms but produce less than 7% of the industry to
tal. Even these firms, however, still diversify: only a quarter sold all
their output to one firm, and over half sold to three or more firms.

c. Relational Stability. Nor does the stability of these relationships
reflect large RSis. First, so long as switching costs are not zero, people
generally expect most relations to be stable. This holds in a wide vari
ety of settings and for a wide variety of reasons - whether employ
ment contracts, marriages, or a businessman's loyalty to his barber. In
equilibrium, stability will be the norm.
Second, Japanese subcontracting relations are ruthlessly competi
tive. To the extent that they are stable, they are stable only because
- in equilibrium - the existing trading partners will be the firms that
do the job better than their potential rivals. As one Toyota director
explained:
Our policy of maintaining double- and multiple-sources is not an op
portunistic one. It follows from the notion that a reasonable level of
competition is good. We're all human, after all. It's through competition
that we'll get improvements in quality, in price, in managerial coordina
tion.50
Suppliers understand this. Only by winning the perpetual tournament
will they maintain - let alone expand - their business with any given
assembler. Take one stamp press firm in the Toyota network. It sold
a variety of stamped and plastic products to Toyota, and had for years.
But it did not wait for Toyota to place orders. At its own cost, on its
own initiative, and with no explicit or implicit commitment from
Toyota, it regularly and aggressively explored new technologies.
When the supplier found something it thought Toyota might want, it
proposed the product to Toyota. If Toyota liked the idea, the supplier
obtained a contract. If Toyota did not, it went back to the lab.51

50. Shoichi Matsuo, Buhin seisaku wa ikkan shita "koyzon kyoei" [Consistency Tums
Parts Policy into One of "Co-existence and Co-prosperity"], in JAPIA, supra note 33, at 13839.
51. Interview by Yoshiro Miwa with president of a 20-employee stamping firm, fall 1999
(identity not disclosed for reasons of confidentiality).
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TABLE 5: SALES DIVERSIFICATION IN THE AUTOMOBILE SECTOR,

BY FIRM SIZE (1996)
Firms, by
Sales Vol.
(billion yen)
10 or less
10-30
30-50
50-100
100-200
over 200

Total firms

A

B
D
c
E
Number of Domestic Buyers to Whom Firm Sells

F
Output

1

2

3-4

5 or more

Total firms

42
(27.1 %)
21
(18.9)
3
(6.3)
1
(2.4)
0
(0)
0
(0)

23
(14.8%)
12
(10.8)
3
(6.3)
0
(0)
1
(7.1)
0
(0)

40
(25.8%)
24
(21.6)
4
(83)
7
(16.7)
0
(0)
0
(0)

50
(32.3%)
54
(48.6)
38
(79.2)
34
(81.0)
13
(92.9)
9
(100)

155
(40.9%)
111
(29.3)
48
(12.7)
42
(11.1)
14
(3.7)
9
(2.4)

920
(6.8%)
2,101
(15.5)
1,916
(14.2)
3,158
(23.3)
2,007
(14.8)
3,436
(25.4)

67
(17.7)

39
(10.3)

75
(19.8)

198
(52.2)

379
(100)

13,538
(100.0)

Notes: For all but the numbers in the two far-right columns, the table gives the number
of firms in each row (firm size) that sell to the number of sellers given at the top of each col
umn, followed by the percentage of all firms in that row. Column E gives the number and
percentage of all firms (379) in that size category. Column F gives the output in billion yen
(and percentage of total industry output) produced by firms it that row.
For reasons of data availability, Column F includes firms that do not directly sell to as
semblers. This distinction is primarily relevant only to the top two rows. Thus, Column F
row 1 includes data on 237 firms rather than 155 firms; row 2 on 121 firms; row 3 on 50 finns,
row 4 on 43 firms, row 4 on 15 firms and row 5 on the same 9 firms.
,

Source: NIHON NO J/DOSHA BUHIN KOGYO (1998 NEN BAN) [JAPANESE AUTOMOTIVE
PARTS INDUSTRY, 1998] 16-17 (Nihon jidosha buhin kogyo kai & Oto toreedo jaaneru, eds.,

1998).
Third, in the end, the relationships are not necessarily stable any
way. Although firms often do keep their existing trading partners, of
ten does not mean always - or even nearly always. Second- and
third-tier firms are particularly prone to shifting partners. These firms
are frequently family firms. Like family firms everywhere, they come
and go as the talents and interests of family members ebb and flow in
generational cycles. Even first-tier contractors shift subcontracting
ties. In 1998, the JAPIA listed 189 suppliers in the Toyota supplier
network. Of these, only 122 (65% ) had been members in 1973. Con
versely, of the 150 firms in the association in 1973, twenty-eight (19%)
had disappeared by 1998.
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Board Seats

Equity investments are not the only extra-contractual governance
mechanisms that assemblers can use. They can also take positions on
their suppliers' boards. Primarily, however, whether an assembler ob
tains such a seat depends on its equity investment.
Again, one can exaggerate the prevalence of assembler representa
tives: only exceptionally do assemblers put their representatives on
supplier boards. Among Japanese automobile parts suppliers, we
have information on the board composition of 209 firms. In 132 of
these firms (63 %), the assemblers had no board representative. When
an assembler did have a board member, the modal number was one
(twenty-six firms, or 12%). At only twenty-seven of the suppliers
(13 % ) did the principal buyer among the automobile assemblers have
five to nine board members, and at only five (2%) did it have ten or
more.
Whether an assembler has a representative on a supplier's board
depends critically on the equity stake that the assembler holds in the
supplier. If we compare the predictive effect on the number of assem
bler representatives (NumDir) of (i) the fraction of S's sales made to
A (Sales%) and (ii) A's equity investment in S (Eq%), the latter pre
dicts far better:

NumDir=-2.85+0.090Eq%+0.019Sales%+0.0003Employees+2.89Listed+e,
(4.96) (S.79)
(1.93)
(2.99)
5.79
where n=120, the absolute value of the t-statistics are in parentheses,
and the adjusted R2 = 0.55.52 Moreover, a regression of NumDir on
Eq% yields a coefficient of 0.10, a t-statistic of 12.25, and an adjusted
R2 of 0.42; a regression on Sales% yields a coefficient of 0.05, a t
statistic of 6.01, and an adjusted R2 of 0.23. For predicting the pres
ence of assembler representatives on a supplier board, the investment
an assembler makes in a supplier's stock matters greatly. The fraction
of its output the supplier sells to the assembler matters far less. Obvi
ously, one does not need RSI theory to explain why director seats
should correlate with stock holdings.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Within industrial organization, scholars increasingly integrate RSI
theory into their analysis of the way firms structure their affairs with
each other. Suppose that production requires large idiosyncratic in
vestments and that detailed contracts are infeasible. In such a world,
production would generate quasi rents, and the quasi rents would in

52. Running the same regression with the Toyota dummy as well does not substantially
change the results; the t-statistic on Toyota is 0.018.
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turn create the risk of ex post opportunism. To mitigate that risk,
scholars reason, firms may negotiate governance mechanisms they
would otherwise avoid.
Although the theory sparked a promising research program, schol
ars generally have found less evidence of large-scale RSis than one
might suppose - particularly of physical-asset specificity, and par
ticularly in industries outside of aerospace, defense, or public utilities.
Accordingly, Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Daniel F. Spulber re
cently concluded that "asset specificity and opportunism in contracts
fail in a fundamental way to explain vertical integration."53 Pierre
Andre Chiappori and Bernard Salanie observe that " [i]n the last 20
years contract theory has developed at a rapid pace . . . , [but] empirical
applications have lagged behind."54 They then suggest that scholars
have exaggerated the more general problem of asymmetric informa
tion in contracting: studying the French insurance market, for exam
ple, they find "no evidence of asymmetric information."55 These
findings are consistent with our findings that standard competitive
market models apply straightforwardly to developing economies.56
Within this empirical context, the Japanese automobile industry
has offered hope. There, at least, observers thought they would find
the combination of large RSis and extra-contractual governance
mechanisms (particularly equity cross-holdings) that RSI theory had
suggested.
Not so. In the Japanese automobile industry RSis are low, and so
are equity cross-holdings. We make this point with a mix of indirect
evidence. We are the first to admit that we lack firm-level direct
measures of RSis. Instead, we bring to the enterprise a wide-ranging
mix of observational evidence and industry data. To that mix, we add
a set of supplementary regressions.
From this evidence, two points stand out. First, among the smaller
firms (which is to say, most firms), the levels of RSis are low for a
simple reason: all investment levels are low. This simply is not a capi
tal intensive sector. Second, among the larger firms (which is to say,
the most productive firms), investment levels are higher - but these
investments seem not to be idiosyncratic, and cross-holdings are low.
These larger suppliers broadly diversify their sales outlets, and seldom
issue significant equity blocks to assemblers.

53. Casadesus-Masanett & Spurber, supra note 7, at 69-70.
54. Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Bernard Salanie, Testing for Asymmetric Information in
the Insurance Markets, 108 J. POL. ECON. 56, 56-57 {2000).
55. Id.
56. See Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Corporate Governance in Transitional
Economies: Lessons from the Prewar Japanese Cotton Textile Industry, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.
171 {2000).
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Through this, we do not purport to disprove RSI theory as theory.
After all, the theory predicts that firms will create distinctive govern
ance mechanisms when RSis are large and contractual solutions infea
sible. If production technology is standard and contracting straight
forward, they will solve any problems by contract. And in the end,
that is pretty much what we show in Japan. Our claim is instead more
modest: that perhaps RSI theory explains a narrower band of phe
nomena than we have thought.

